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BUYER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 2(f) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Douglas E. Ray*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amend-
ments to the Clayton Act were enacted in an attempt to curb the
ability of large businesses to coerce sellers of products into grant-
ing them discriminatory price advantages over smaller purchasers,1
only one section of the Act, section 2(f)2 which prohibits the know-
ing inducement or receipt of discriminatory prices, is aimed at
buyers. The remainder of the Act is directed toward sellers. Liabil-
ity3 under section 2(f) is generally derivative in nature, being based
* Assistant Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A.,
1971, University of Minnesota; J.D., 1975, Harvard University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of his research assistant,
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1. See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
2. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976), provides that "[i]t
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
See generally F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 421-51
(1962); Galanti, Buyer Liability for Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Prices, Terms,
and Promotional Allowances-Caveat Emptor in the 1970's, 7 IND. L. REV. 962 (1974);
Note, The Evolving Duty of an Innocent Buyer to Inquire into His Bargain Under Section
2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 IND. L.J. 348 (1974).
3. The Federal Trade Commission is authorized to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act and
to seek cease and desist orders. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976). Because § 2 is an "antitrust law"
within the meaning of § 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976), its prohibitions can
also be enforced by private plaintiffs seeking treble damages or injunctive relief, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 15, 26 (1976).
For a discussion of the possible use of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1976), against buyers, see Galanti, supra note 2, at 963-64 nn.2&5. The FTC has also used
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to attack the knowing inducement or receipt of
discriminatory promotional allowances, services or facilities barred to the seller by 2(d) and
2(e). See, e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974); R.H. Macy & Co.
v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 185-86
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d
104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92,
99-100 (2d Cir. 1962); Herbert R. Gibson, Jr. et a, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,844 (FTC
1976) (complaint); Fred Meyer, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,086 (FTC 1976) (settle-
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on a preliminary finding of seller liability under another section of
the Act. Because of this derivative nature of buyer liability and
because other sections of the Act define what is and what is not a
"discriminatory price," it is important to understand those sec-
tions of the Act directed toward sellers.
In the usual case, a finding of buyer liability under section 2(f)
will require a preliminary finding of seller liability under section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 4 which prohibits seller price dis-
ment of civil penalty case for alleged violation of 1968 FTC order regarding inducement of
promotional allowances).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976), provides in
pertinent part that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." The courts
have adopted the position that a buyer's receipt of discriminatory promotional allowances,
services or facilities is per se violative of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and that
there is no requirement that injury to competition be established. See R.H. Macy & Co. v.
FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1964); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 99-100 (2d Cir.
1962).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such pur-
chasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission
may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish
quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodi-
ties or classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater
.quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discrimina-
tory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then
not be construed to permit differentials based on differences in quantities greater
than those so fixed and established: And provided further, That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in com-
merce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in re-
straint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting
the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
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crimination in contemporaneous sales of like commodities in inter-
state commerce5 to competing buyers when competitive injury may
result.
The following elements must generally be established to prove a
section 2(a) violation by a seller in commerce: (1) there must be a
discrimination in price;6 (2) the discrimination in price must be be-
tween different "purchasers";7 (3) the involved sales must be of
"commodities," a term which includes tangible goods but not ser-
vices;8 (4) the involved commodities must be of like grade and
quality;9 (5) at least one of the sales involved must be "in com-
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business
in the goods oncerned.
5. Section 2(a), involving seller liability, has been interpreted to require only that one of
the two sales giving rise to the discrimination, the higher or the lower, be in interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); Foremost Dair-
ies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 677 n.5 (5th Cir. 1965). However, there is an argument that
the commerce language of § 2(f) requires that the buyer receive its discriminatory price
concession in the course of interstate commerce. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d
971, 979 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). For a discussion of why
such reading might be contrary to Congressional intent, see Paceco, Inc. v. Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 468 F. Supp. 256, 259-60 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (domestic manufac-
turer of steel cranes sues Japanese manufacturers of similar cranes allegedly assembled in
United States regarding purchases of steel from Japanese steel producers at allegedly dispa-
rate prices). For a full discussion of recent developments affecting interpretation of the ju-
risdictional scope of §§ 2(a) and 2(f), see Galanti, It Once Again Takes Two to Tango: Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 387, 402-12 (1979).
6. Price means the actual price at which goods are sold. In re National Lead Co., 49 FTC
791 (1953). Price can include the terms and conditions of sale. See Corn Products Co. v.
FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); see also Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp.,
254 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. IMI. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966). The sales at
different prices must be by the same seller. See, e.g., Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.
1957).
7. See Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) (holding Act inapplicable to consignments). In certain situa-
tions, purchasers from wholesalers or distributors can be held "indirect purchasers" from
the seller-manufacturer. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977) (limiting scope of indirect purchaser doctrine);
Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901
(1969). With respect to parent-subsidiary relationships, compare Security Tire and Rubber
Co. v. The Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979)
with Schaben v. Samuel Moore & Co., 606 F.2d 831, 833 n.3 (8th Cir. 1979).
8. See, e.g., Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186 (5th
Cir. 1978).
9. See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (chemically identical milk sold under dif-
ferent brand names held to be of like grade and quality).
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merce"; 10 and (6) there must be a reasonable likelihood of an ad-
verse effect on competition.11
The Supreme Court, in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,1 2 has in-
terpreted a "price discrimination" under section 2(a) to be synony-
mous with a "price differentiation." Is Sections 2(a) and 2(b)14 pro-
vide sellers with certain defenses including savings in costs,
changed marketing conditions and the good faith meeting of an
equally low price offered by a competitor.
Section 2(c)1 5 prohibits the payment of brokerage commissions
10. See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); note 5 supra. But see
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Inc. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding
Act inapplicable where one leg of alleged discrimination involved sales in Japan because
both sales must be for use, consumption or resale in the United States).
11. The Act's language with respect to competitive effect has been read by the courts to
reach price discriminations "in their incipiency" before competition has actually been
harmed. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945). Showing a reasonable
probability or possibility of injury is sufficient. Id. at 739, 742. Such anti-competitive effect
may occur at either the seller level or buyer level of competition. If the former, it is called
primary line; if the latter, it is referred to as secondary line. The Act has been read to
protect buyer competition down to the level of customers of customers of customers of the
seller. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969). Whether a broad reading of the
competitive injury requirement, at least at the primary level, fosters competition, however,
is subject to question. Compare Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967)
with Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975); Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 18,
27-31 (1976). For a more extensive treatment of this subject, see ABA ANTIRUST SECTION,
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, VOL. I, 72-106 (Monograph No. 4, 1980).
12. 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
13. Id. at 549-50.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976) provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirm-
atively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the dis-
crimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the fur-
nishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by
a competitor.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative,
550
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or discounts in lieu of brokerage to a buyer, agent of a buyer or by
either the buyer or the seller to an agent of the other. This subsec-
tion, not discussed in this article, has no direct relationship to sec-
tion 2(f). Sections 2(d) e and 2(e)17 prohibit a seller from granting
promotional allowances, services or facilities to a customer unless
such assistance is made available on proportionally equal terms to
all competing customers. Section 2(d) applies when a supplier
makes payments for promotional services rendered by the cus-
tomer and section 2(e) applies when he provides the promotional
services or facilities to his customers. Sections 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e)
are per se provisions. There need be no showing of competitive in-
jury nor does the defense of cost justification apply.,e Firms
charged with violations of 2(d) and 2(e) may, however, assert the
meeting-competition defense."'
The Supreme Court has twice had occasion to interpret section
2(f). In Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,20 the Court set forth the
basic standards for enforcement of section 2(f) and allocated the
burden of coming forward with evidence. In Great Atlantic & Pa-
or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in be-
half, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction
other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contact for the
payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the
course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facil-
ities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, han-
dling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or
offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on
proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of
such products or commodities.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without
processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnish-
ing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offer-
ing for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchas-
ers on proportionally equal terms.
18. See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1959); Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
19. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc.
v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502-04 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
20. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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cific Tea Co. v. FTC,21 decided in 1979, the Court reaffirmed that
buyer liability under section 2(f) is dependent on seller liability
and held that, if the seller has a valid defense, the buyer cannot be
held liable either.
Prior to the A & P decision, a limited exception to the notion of
derivative liability had been recognized by the Sixth Circuit in
Kroger Co. v.. FTC.2 2 In that case, the buyer falsely alleged to the
supplier that a lower price had been offered by a competitor. In
good faith reliance on this information, the supplier then offered
what it thought was a competing price. The court held that the
buyer had violated section 2(f), while the section 2(a) complaint
was dismissed as to the seller because it had in good faith granted
the discriminatory price to meet competition, a recognized defense.
Whether the Kroger doctrine, the so-called "lying buyer" excep-
tion survives the Supreme Court's A & P decision is presently an
open question. The majority in A & P distinguished Kroger and,
by footnote, expressly refused to decide the question. 3 Justice
Marshall, dissenting in part, argued that the strong derivative
standard apparently adopted by the Court may have written the
"lying buyer" exception out of existence.24 Since the "lying buyer"
exception to the notion of derivative liability serves an important
role in fostering the policies underlying the Robinson-Patman Act,
it is submitted that the A & P decision should not be read by
courts as eliminating it. Its demise would be an unnecessary and
unfortunate consequence of A & p. 25
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amendments to section 2 of the
Clayton Act of 1914 were enacted at a time of economic recession
when the power of certain buyers was perceived to be excessive.
New types of businesses, utilizing integrated forms of product dis-
tribution, had begun to appear, exemplified by the grocery chain
21. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
22. 438 F.2d 1372, 1376-77 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
23. 440 U.S. at 81-82 n. 15.
24. 440 U.S. at 88.
25. See text accompanying notes 107-114 infra. For an excellent discussion of the A&P
case and its implications in this regard, see Galanti, supra note 5.
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and the mail-order house. It was feared that these enterprises
might threaten and ruin the small merchants and independent
wholesalers and brokers who comprised the traditional channel for
distribution of products. 8
Thus, the Act was intended to curb the various discriminatory
advantages large chain and institutional purchasers had been able
to extract from their suppliers and, at the same time, protect
smaller purchasers lacking such buying power. As the bill's cospon-
sor, Congressman Wright Patman, stated in the House floor
debate:
What are the objectives of this bill? Mr. Chairman there has grown
up in this country a policy in business that a few rich, powerful or-
ganizations by reason of their size and their ability to coerce and
intimidate manufacturers have forced those manufacturers to give
them their goods at a lower price than they give to the independent
merchants under the same and similar circumstances and for the
same quantities of goods. Is that right or wrong? It is wrong.27
The draftsman of the bill also discussed the bill's aim. The seller
"must not.., be permitted to bleed part of his customers for the
benefit of the others, and if any of his customers have the power to
compel him to do so, that power constitutes the evil against which
this bill is directed."2 s
According to Congressman Patman, "buying power is the source
of the evil. The seller is merely an innocent victim compelled usu-
ally in self-defense to grant the concessions demanded. '29 The
chain-store investigation carried on by the FTC at the request of
the Senate provided evidence that large buyers did have coercive
power.30 In the same vein, Senator Logan, speaking of brokerage
26. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
155 (1955). Hereafter referred to as "Report." See also 80 CONG. REC. 9416-19 (1936).
27. 80 CONG. REc. 8111 (1936).
28. Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 10, at 31 (1935) (remarks of H.B. Teegarden).
29. Id., quoted in Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382, 420 (1960).
30. See FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26, (1935). Congress was concerned that the lower prices induced through
use of this power went not to lower prices for consumers but to higher salaries for the chain-
store executives. 80 CoNG. REc. 8113 (1936).
19811 553
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fees, stated:
Do not tell me that any manufacturer willingly and gladly gives such
tremendous sums to the purchaser. He is coerced into it by the fact
that the purchasing power has become so great that the seller is
afraid to antagonize it. He must yield to any demand that may be
made by the great purchaser.3 1
Congress was concerned with the effect such power in the
hands of buyers could have on the entire framework of competi-
tion. As Congressman Utterback, Chairman of the House-Senate
Conference Committee, stated in presenting the bill to the House:
Discriminatory prices and allowances are a millstone around the
neck of the manufacturer, large or small; because in granting favors
to a selected few of their customers, they give those few a competi-
tive advantage over the rest, and enable them gradually to drive the
rest out of business and thereby to destroy them as customers. In
granting such discriminations the manufacturer is therefore commit-
ting a form of slow suicide. .... 32
Despite the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to
curb discriminatory concessions exacted by powerful buyers, Con-
gress chose to retain the statutory framework of the original sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act, which was directed at sellers. It has been
suggested that this approach was taken because the draftsmen
were concerned with the constitutionality of an act directed solely
at buyers.3
Consequently, the bills originally introduced in Congress con-
tained no reference to illegal practices on the part of buyers. As
the Attorney General's Report noted, "Discriminatory concessions
which allegedly enabled big buyers to menace the economic sur-
vival of smaller rivals-the essential evil contemplated by the
Act-were thus checked by circuitously fortifying the law's
prohibitions on sellers granting the discriminations. ' '34
31. 80 CONG. REC. 6281 (1936).
32. 80 CONG. REc. 9416 (1936). See also 80 CONG. REc. 6284 (1936) (indicating that Con-
gress feared increased concentration leading to complete monopoly).
33. Rowe, supra note 2, at 423.
34. Report, supra note 26, at 193 n.15.
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The present section 2(f), directed at buyers, was introduced as
an amendment offered in debate on the floor of the Senate. It was
passed by the Senate and accepted by the House conferees. As de-
scribed by the Attorney General's Report, "Section 2(f) repre-
sented a last minute afterthought addition to the anti-discrimina-
tion law."3 5 Thus, there is little legislative history. Comment on
the floor of the Senate concerning this provision was to the effect
that it seemed "sound in principle." 3
Congressman Utterback, presenting the report of the conference
committee, did discuss the meaning and purpose of section 2(f). He
said:
This affords a valuable support to the manufacturer in his efforts to
abide by the intent and purpose of the bill. It makes it easier for
him to resist the demand for sacrificial price costs coming from
mass-buyer customers, since it enables him to charge them with
knowledge of the illegality of the discount, and equal liability for it,
by informing them that it is in excess of any differential which his
difference in cost would justify as compared with his other
customers.3
7
Despite the addition of section 2(f), an anomaly remained. While
the legislative history expressed a primary concern with the power
of large buyers, the statute remained directed primarily at sellers.
III. THE Automatic Canteen CASE
Since the legislative history provides little guidance as to how
section 2(f) is to be applied practically, the first Supreme Court
interpretation of section 2(f) is of particular importance. In Auto-
matic Canteen Co. v. FTC,38 Automatic Canteen leased vending
machines for candy and was also a large wholesale supplier of
candy for the machines and thus a correspondingly large buyer of
candy from manufacturers. The FTC alleged that Automatic Can-
teen pressured manufacturers to give it special price concessions.
The company was thought to have negotiated for supplies by quot-
35. Id.
36. 80 CONG. REc. 6428 (1936).
37. 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
38. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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ing a price which it thought the manufacturers should be able to
meet, one substantially below the price other wholesalers were get-
ting. While the manufacturer was told of the savings he might en-
joy in supplying large buyers such as Automatic Canteen, the com-
pany did not inquire as to whether the manufacturer who accepted
its prices would make cost savings to the extent necessary to jus-
tify them.
In proceedings before the FTC, it was demonstrated that Auto-
matic Canteen had secured prices as much as one third below
those obtained by rivals. Based on this evidence, the Commission
held that the buyer had knowingly received a favorable concession
sufficiently sizeable to cause injurious market effects, thus estab-
lishing a prima facie 2(f) violation. The buyer was then obligated
to prove the violation as either non-injurious or otherwise justi-
fied.39 Holding that the company had not met this burden, the
FTC found it to have violated section 2(f). The decision was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,40 which
held that the FTC need establish only that the buyer knowingly
received a price substantially different from that given his compet-
itors in order to shift the burden of proving that such price was
cost-justified to the buyer. Noting several problems with this hold-
ing, the Supreme Court reversed.41
The issue which the Supreme Court considered to be before it
was procedural in nature and concerned "simply the burden of
coming forward with evidence under section 2(f) of the Act. 41 2 As a
"necessary preliminary" to deciding the "precise issue, '43 the
Court analyzed the substantive prohibition of section 2(f) against
the knowing receipt of an illegal discrimination in price.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, holds
that standards for substantive violation of section 2(f) incorporate
those of 2(a) and 2(b), which define price discrimination by a
seller. Thus, price differences are not illegal under section 2(f) if
they can be justified by the seller's cost savings, his good faith
39. 46 F.T.C. 861, 896 (1950).
40. 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
41. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
42. Id. at 65.
43. Id. at 74.
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meeting of competition or a lack of competitive injury. The word
"knowingly" was held to require that the buyer know that the
prices he received were not justified by one of the seller's defenses.
The opinion points out that if the buyer could be held to violate
the Act without knowing that the price was not cost-justified, price
bargaining could take place only where the seller's costs were laid
open on the bargaining table, a step the Court did not intend to
require."
The Court held that the buyer must not only be shown to have
obtained an illegal concession, but also to have had actual knowl-
edge or reason to believe it was illegaL The FTC had never re-
quired this element of culpable knowledge.
The construction applied by the FTC and Seventh Circuit, re-
jected by the Court, would have required the buyer to prove the
legality of the price obtained. In contrast, the Court held that the
obligation of going forward with the evidence should be measured
under a more flexible standard of fairness and convenience.45 By
this standard, the burden of going forward with evidence relating
to costs was the obligation of the FTC. Commenting on the Court's
reasoning, the Attorney General's Report stated:
But the Court realized that a buyer charged with accepting a
favorable differential could not ordinarily be expected to possess in-
formation of the seller's cost data adequate to negativing possible
illegality through a "cost justification" of the seller's price. Rather,
the Court coined a rule of "convenience" and fairness by which the
production of evidence as to cost savings, wherever appropriate as
an element in the buyer's illegality, became the task of the Commis-
sion which was obviously better equipped than the buyer for investi-
gating his supplier's book of account.46
By so allocating the burden of coming forward with evidence, the
Court did not intend to make a "dead letter" of section 2(f) en-
forcement though, at the time, the opinion was interpreted as do-
ing just that.47 The opinion indicates that a buyer's knowledge of a
44. Id. at 69.
45. Id. at 79.
46. Report, supra note 26, at 194-95.
47. The initial interpretation of Automatic Canteen was that it put an onerous burden of
19811
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lack of cost justification may be inferred from the fact that other
buyers made identical purchases at a higher price or that the
proven cost savings were much too small to justify the price differ-
ential. The Court suggested that culpable knowledge will be found
if the buyer should have known that there would not be cost sav-
ings. The Court suggested that the FTC could discharge this bur-
den by submitting "trade experience" evidence.43
Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not think the Court had placed an
undue administrative burden on the FTC. In his view, section 2(f)
enforcement would still reach a buyer who, "knowing full well that
there was little likelihood of a defense for the seller, nevertheless
proceeded to exert pressure for lower prices."4 9
The Court did not rule conclusively on the burden of producing
evidence with respect to the meeting-competition defense. How-
ever, the court suggested that evidence as to competitive offers
might be more readily available to the buyer than to the
Commission.50
The Court also expressed concern with the effect of its decision
on the marketplace. The Court pointed out that it would not read
the Robinson-Patman Act
as putting the buyer at his peril whenever he engages in price bar-
gaining. Such a reading must be rejected in view of the effect it
might have on that sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller for
which scope was presumably left in the areas of our economy not
otherwise regulated."'
The Court was also vitally concerned with reconciling the Robin-
son-Patman Act "with broader antitrust policies. '52
In approving the antitrust rationale of the decision, the Attorney
General's Report recognized that price bargaining by aggressive
proof on the FTC, which it did not. As a result, several pending cases against buyers were
dropped. See Rowe, supra note 2, at 441-42.
48. 346 U.S. at 79-80.
49. Id. at 79.
50. Id..
51. Id. at 73-74.
52. Id. at 74.
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buyers can sometimes have a beneficial effect on the market and
that to condemn it out of hand might well "deprive the public of
gains that under effective competition it has a right to expect."5 3
Such an effect can occur in an oligopoly-type market where sellers
exercise control over prices. To the extent that competition among
buyers exists, a price reduction to a buyer with bargaining power
will result in lower prices to the public. Further reductions are
likely to spread to other buyers once it becomes known that some
sellers are cutting prices. To disallow such price bargaining is to
enable the sellers to maintain their oligopolistic structure and high
prices. Were the Robinson-Patman Act to reach so far, it would
serve to police and maintain oligopolistic behavior.
IV. WHAT MUST BE SHOWN BY PLAINTIFF
The Supreme Court stated in Automatic Canteen that a
prima facie case may readily be established under section 2(f)
against a buyer who knows "that the methods by which he was
served and quantities in which he purchased were the same as in
the case of his competitor." However, when the buyer alters his
methods of purchase or quantities bought, more must be shown.
The plaintiff must then show "that such differences could not give
rise to sufficient savings in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery
to justify the price differential, and that the buyer, knowing these
were the only differences, should have known that they could not
give rise to sufficient cost savings." 55
Thus, when a buyer purchases in a different manner or amount
than his competitors, the FTC or treble damage plaintiff is faced
with the double burden of showing (1) that the lower price was not
in fact cost-justified and (2) that the buyer "should have known"
this fact.
A. Lack of Cost Justification
The Court did not establish how much the party plaintiff need
show to meet its first burden, that the price was not in fact cost-
53. Report, supra note 26, at 196.
54. 346 U.S. at 80.
55. Id.
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justified. If the FTC or treble damage plaintiff need produce, in
each suit, a cost study proving that the price received was not cost-
justified, the burden might well render the section ineffective and a
"dead letter."
In a 1966 case,56 the Ninth Circuit ruled that, at least where the
buyer continued to purchase in the usual methods and on usual
terms, the Commission was not required to submit detailed cost
surveys on seller's costs, stating that to require cost studies or cost
surveys in all 2(f) proceedings would "often be an exercise in
futility.' '57
Similarly, in a 1968 interlocutory opinion,58 the FTC addressed
itself to this issue declaring that it need come forward only with a
prima facie showing that the buyer should have known that his
lower price could not be cost-justified, and that it need not intro-
duce evidence as to the actual absence of cost justification. Ac-
cepting the initial burden of coming forward, the Commission
shifts the burden to the buyer once the Commission has intro-
duced evidence that the buyer should have known of the absence
of cost justification.59
The Commission's resolution of this issue seems consistent with
the Automatic Canteen standard of convenience and fairness. A
negative fact is difficult to prove and this fact is particularly elu-
56. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390
U.S. 341 (1968).
57. Id. at 364.
58. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 73 F.T.C. 1269 (1968) (interlocutory ruling). This stan-
dard was approved by the Commission in Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 19,045 (FTC 1970).
59. The buyer may attempt to meet this burden by procuring a pro forma assurance let-
ter from its seller in an attempt to justify price breaks. In Colonial Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 450
F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1971), a § 5 case involving charges that a chain had induced discrimina-
tory advertising allowances, suppliers had signed forms indicating that similar advertising
allowances were offered to competitors. The court held that the forms were not entitled to
evidentiary weight because they were signed a month after the promotion began and the
buyer already had good reason to suspect that the payments were discriminatory.
The same reasoning can be applied to written assurances by the seller that prices ob-
tained are cost-justified. The assurances should be entitled to little weight if the buyer has
good reason to suspect that the prices are not cost-justified. Though not deciding the issue,
the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen indicated that together with other circumstances,
the furnishing of such an assurance might indicate an absence of arms-length bargaining
sufficient to raise doubts as to the weight to be given to it. 346 U.S. at 80-81 n.24.
[Vol. 15:547
BUYER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 2(F)
sive. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "[p]roof of a cost justifica-
tion being what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether a price
is cost-justified. 6 0
B. Buyer Knowledge and Trade Experience
Mr. Justice Frankfurter went on to say in Automatic Canteen
that "trade experience in a particular situation can afford a suffi-
cient degree of knowledge to provide a basis for prosecution."'61
Just what degree of knowledge is sufficient to prove a violation and
the circumstances from which it can be inferred have been central
issues in all subsequent 2(f) cases.
The standard for establishing culpable knowledge was discussed
in a series of cases involving group buying in the automotive parts
industry. Although section 2(f) of the Act is specifically addressed
to the Act's central purpose, curbing the power of large chain buy-
ers, it was used in the 1960's to attack small jobbers in the automo-
tive parts industry who had banded together for the purpose of
group buying.
The jobbers, representing small businesses which operated in a
very competitive market, formed themselves into cooperatives in
order to strengthen their bargaining positions and better enable
them to compete with the large chain stores, oil companies and
auto dealers who also sold parts.
Many of these attempts were characterized as mere "bookkeep-
ing devices" through which cumulative volume discounts were of-
fered to favored buyers who ordered supplies through such groups.
Such groups were held to be cooperatives in name only6V 2 and were
found to have violated section 2(f) on the ground that they should
have known that competitive retailers whose operatives were con-
60. 346 U.S. at 79.
61. Id. at 79-80.
62. See Mid-South Distributors v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
838 (1961) (Orders were sent through group but goods were shipped directly to individual
members from seller. The court concluded that individual jobbers knew their method of
purchase represented no cost savings for the seller.). See also American Motor Specialties
Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960) (Members sent their
orders either directly to the seller or through the buying group. Orders were handled indi-
vidually and parts were shipped directly to the individual members.).
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ducted on a similar scale were not receiving discounts similar to
the wholesaler's discounts received by the groups."3
Subsequent to these cases, the groups became more sophisti-
cated and began performing warehousing services. The Commis-
sion, nonetheless, continued to find violations. In In re National
Parts Warehouses," the buying group consisted of more than fifty
members. It purchased for its own account, warehoused goods,
billed its jobber-member customers and settled its accounts with
suppliers on a monthly basis. The Commission found the individ-
ual jobber members to have violated section 2(f).
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Commission, relying upon the
"substantial evidence" rule. The court found that the group re-
ceived a twenty percent discount as a warehouse distributor but
did not perform a significant selling function. Only six percent of
its volume was accounted for by sales to nonmember jobbers. Fur-
ther, it did not perform a complete distribution function for its
members since approximately twenty percent of its dollar volume
was accounted for by direct shipments from suppliers to mem-
bers.e5 In American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC,65-1 volume dis-
63. See, e.g., Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Mid-South
Distributors v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961); Ameri-
can Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960);
In re National Parts Warehouse, 63 F.T.C. 1692 (1963), afl'd sub nom. General Auto Sup-
plies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965). See gener-
ally Kintner, Romano and Filippini, Cooperative Buying and Antitrust: The Search for
Competitive Equality, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 971, 973-98 (1972-73).
64. 63 F.T.C. 1692 (1963).
65. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 382 U.S.
923 (1965).
To impose Robinson-Patman Act liability on individual members in these cases, the Com-
mission resorts to the "buyer corollary" of the "indirect purchaser" doctrine. In In re Na-
tional Parts Warehouse the Commission explained that it felt application of this doctrine
was necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The buyer corollary of this rule is that the seller-purchaser relationship is similarly
established if a purported middleman, instead of being under the "control" of the
seller, is "controlled" by the buyer himself. Since the very purpose of the statute is
"to protect buyers' competitors," . . . there is even more reason for its application
where it is the buyer, rather than the seller, that controls the intermediary. It would
be a strange result indeed to hold that seller-controlled intermediaries must be
pierced in order to protect buyer's competitors, but refuse to permit such piercing
where it is the favored purchaser himself who has devised a "middleman" to procure
for him discriminatory advantages over his competitors.
63 F.T.C. 1692 at 1717-18.
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counts were granted to groups of distributors who pooled the indi-
vidual purchases of their members to receive prices lower than
those received by their competitors. Discussing the buyers' posi-
tion, the Second Circuit said:
Petitioners of course knew that they, as individual firms, were re-
ceiving goods in the same quantities and were served by sellers in
the same manner as their competitors, and hence organized them-
selves into a buying group in order to obtain lower prices than their
unorganized competitors. Hence, by the very fact of having com-
bined into a group and having obtained thereby a favorable price
differential, they each, under Automatic Canteen were charged with
Dissenting in In re National Parts Warehouse, Commissioner Elman criticized the major-
ity test as falling to reach the question of whether the group actually performed the same
purchasing and distribution functions as other warehousing distributors who received the
same functional discount. He saw the Commission's decisions in this area as leading the
demise of the cooperative buying group. 63 F.T.C. at 1739-44.
The Act requires that sellers not discriminate in price between different purchasers. In
the early cases, it is easy to support the Commission's characterization of the members as
indirect purchasers. Where the intermediate group performs no services and is a mere shell,
fairness to other buyers requires that the substance of the transaction and not the form
control.
Where the group performs services, however, care must be taken that the formalism of the
indirect buyer theory not prevent recognition that the buying group does exist and does
incur expenses which might save the supplier costs. Commissioner Jones, dissenting in Al-
hambra Motor Parts v. FTC [1965-1967 Binder] TRADE PBa. REP. (CCH) 117,410, at 22,636
-40 advocated that a buying group which performs a warehousing function, permits central-
ized billing by the seller on its own credit and otherwise provides savings for the seller may
be entitled to accept a functional discount where it has a reasonable basis for believing that
the seller has a cost justification. In her view, the fact that the buying groups incur these
distribution costs permitted it to assume equal cost savings accrue to the seller.
To adhere too rigidly to a notion of piercing the intermediary is to impede the achieve-
ment of economics through vertical integration. Where the buying group does more in the
distribution process than the ordinary retailer and there is no direct commercial contract
between the original seller and the ultimate retailer, the group should be viewed to occupy a
higher rung on the functional ladder. To the extent that it is recognized as an entity, its
competitors are other distributors at the same level and the prices it receives should be
compared on that basis.
Further, enforcement of the Act against real cooperatives may violate Congressional in-
tent. As Mr. Rowe has noted, Congress expressed an "intention to preserve the benefits
enjoyed by co-op members through favorable buying arrangements." Rowe, supra note 2 at
425-28, 451. See also 80 CONG. Rac. 9415 (1936). Indeed, the bill was intended to give the
co-ops the same advantages enjoyed by chain's in this regard. As Congressman Patman
stated, "[i]t is a very foolish co-op that would be against this bill." 80 CONG. REc. 8114
(1936). For a thorough discussion of problems in this area see Austern, "Presumption and
Percipience About Competitive Effect," 81 HARv. L. Rav. 773, 799-807 (1968).
65.1. 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
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notice that this price differential they each enjoyed could not be jus-
tified. And this knowledge of each of the seventeen individual firms
is imputable to the organization of which they were all members."
In Mid-South Distributors v. FTC,67 a presumption that the
buyer knew that the seller's price could not be justified was held
established by facts showing that the buyer knew, as to any
purchase order, that the price he was obtaining through the co-op
was substantially lower than his competitors were required to pay
and secondly that for all practical purposes the order and ship-
ment were handled exactly the same way. 8
In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC,69 the Ninth Circuit found that the
buyer had induced discriminatory prices from suppliers in viola-
tion of section 2(f).70 Fred Meyer, Inc., an Oregon grocery chain,
had regularly conducted an annual promotion sale, printed dis-
count coupon books and solicited suppliers to place advertisements
in the books at a rate of $350 per page. These payments covered
the cost of the promotion, including discounts to customers. The
FTC attacked the scheme on the ground that the cash payments
were an illegal price discrimination. Fred Meyer argued that, due
to the differing quantities purchased by competitors, it had no rea-
son to know of the illegality.
In affirming the Commission's finding of illegality, the Ninth
Circuit noted three findings of the Commission: first, none of
Meyer's suppliers granted quantity discounts to anyone else; sec-
ond, Meyer received the discount only one month of the year; and
third, many of the rebates resulted in prices substantially below
normal. The court held that these facts were sufficient to meet the
Commission's burden that the buyer knew or should have known
66. Id. at 228.
67. 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961). Similarly in Alhambra Mo-
tor Parts, 68 FTC 1039 (1965), the FTC held it sufficient to show that savings realized by
the seller, including those resulting from a warehousing service, did not justify the lower
price received by members. The Commission inferred culpable knowledge from the fact that
certain jobbers had made purchases from the same suppliers before joining the buying group
and could compare their bargains. Id. at 1083. The Commission held that the inference of
knowledge was also supported by the general trade experience of the members.
68. 287 F.2d at 518.
69. 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
70. Certiorari requested from this portion of the decision was denied. 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
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that the prices received were not cost-justified. Meyer's knowledge
was a function of trade experience and the court pointed to specific
facts which Meyer had reason to know, including profit margins of
various wholesalers and pricing theory in the retail market. Meyer
had a "vigorous intelligence network" which supplied it with infor-
mation about prevailing prices and practices of competitors.
The case can be seen as an easy one for the Commission on the
issue of knowledge due to the suddenness, depth and exclusivity of
the price reduction. Fred Meyer had purchased in large quantities
during the entire year and thus the reviewing court was justified in
declaring that the buyer should have known "something was
amiss''71 when prices were suddenly reduced thirty-three percent
by a supplier to coincide with Fred Meyer's thirty day coupon sale.
The court agreed that the Commission could properly infer, with-
out a cost study, that the buyer was not an unsuspecting recipient
of prohibited discriminations.
The Beatrice-Kroger case7 2 also indicates that a buyer can be
held to a high standard of knowledge with respect to prevailing
competitive costs. The procurement scheme in that case, unlike
that in Fred Meyer, was difficult to compare. It involved a
"stripped services" contract that may well have been designed to
avoid Robinson-Patman Act liability. The FTC majority found
that Kroger, the purchaser, had reason to know the Beatrice offer
was not cost-justified, pointing out that the evidence complied
with Automatic Canteen's reference to trade experience as a
source of proof of a buyer's knowledge. Kroger's negotiator had
thorough knowledge of the dairy industry, had experience with pri-
vate label arrangements and had investigated conditions in the
area involved in the negotiations.73 Further, one of the dairies par-
ticipating in the bidding expressly premised its withdrawal from
the bidding on the lack of cost justification for further cuts.7 4 This
element of the case is consistent with the purpose of section 2(f) as
71. 359 F.2d at 364.
72. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,045 (FTC 1969), aff'd sub
nom in Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). For
discussion of other aspects of this case, see text accompanying notes 85-101, infra.
73. See also The Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971, 981 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 69 (1979) ("A&P was no novice in the dairy industry").
74. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH) 19,045 at 21,293.
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explained in the legislative history. According to Congressman Ut-
terback, the provision was designed to allow the pressured seller to
resist the aggressive buyer by pointing out the illegality of his price
demands.15 The use of a warning like that given in Beatrice-Kroger
to constitute an element of buyer knowledge gives effect to this
legislative purpose.
V. THE A & P CASE
In February 1979, the Supreme Court issued only its second in-
terpretation of section 2(f) in the history of the Act, Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC.78 The facts, as discussed by the
Court, are that A & P sought to achieve cost savings at more than
200 stores in the Chicago area (including portions of Illinois and
Indiana) by shifting from sale of milk sold under the brand name
of the supplying dairy to the sale of milk sold under the A & P
label. In furtherance of this plan, A & P asked Borden Co., a long-
time supplier of A & P, to submit an offer to supply milk and dairy
products for resale on a "private-label" basis. Borden submitted an
offer which it claimed would save A & P $410,000 per year com-
pared to prior practice. A & P then solicited from one of Borden's
competitors an offer which allegedly would have produced annual
savings for A & P of approximately $737,000.
A & P's buyer then contacted Borden's sales manager, stating
that Borden's bid was "not even in the ball park." The buyer re-
fused to give further details when asked, except to note that a
$50,000 improvement in Borden's bid "would not be a drop in the
bucket."
Borden, faced with the prospect of substantial underutilization
of a new plant if it lost the A & P account, ultimately submitted a
second bid which would result in annual savings to A & P of
$820,000. In presenting the offer, Borden emphasized that the offer
was made to meet the competitor's bid and that it needed to keep
A & P's business. A & P accepted this offer.
The FTC filed a complaint against A & P, charging it with viola-
75. 80 CONG. REC. 9419 (1936).
76. 440 U.S. 69 (1979). For a thorough treatment of this case and its possible implica-
tions, see Galanti, supra note 5.
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tions of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and section
2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The essence of the section 5
complaint was that A & P had failed to inform Borden that its
second offer was better than the competitor's bid. In effect, this
failure to disclose was also at the heart of the section 2(f) charge.
The Commission, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, dis-
missed the charge on the grounds that imposing a duty of affirma-
tive disclosure would be contrary to normal business practice and
contrary to the public interest.77 The Commission upheld the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's finding that Borden had discriminated in
price between A & P and its competitors, that the discrimination
had been injurious to competition, and that A & P knew or should
have known it was the beneficiary of unlawful price discrimination.
The Commission rejected the defenses made by A & P that Bor-
den's bid had been made to meet competition and had been cost-
justified.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the decision of the Commission. 8
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Mr. Justice Stew-
art, reversed. The Court focused on the derivative nature of liabil-
ity under section 2(f). The FTC had argued to the Court that,
since A & P knew that the final Borden bid undercut the competi-
tive bid, it should not be entitled to assert the defense of meeting
competition even though Borden may have honestly believed it
was simply meeting competition. Rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that "[t]he clear language of §2(f) states that a buyer
can be liable only if he receives a price discrimination 'prohibited
by this section'. If a seller has a valid meeting competition defense,
there is simply no prohibited price discrimination. 7 9
The Court also looked to the effect on the marketplace of impos-
ing section 2(f) liability in the case before it, determining that such
a holding could result in "price uniformity and rigidity."80 In the
Court's view, a duty of affirmative disclosure would likely frustrate
competitive bidding and quite easily lead to price matching and
77. 440 U.S. at 74.
78. 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
79. 440 U.S. at 78.
80. Id. at 80.
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other anti-competitive behavior. 1
Since the Commission and Court of Appeals held that the buyer
could be liable under section 2(f) even if the seller had a meeting
competition defense, they made no specific finding that Borden
had such a defense. Reviewing the evidence for itself, the Court
determined that Borden "quite clearly" did have such a defense
and held that "a buyer who has done no more than accept the
lower of two prices competitively offered does not violate §2(f),
provided the seller has a meeting competition defense. '8 2
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, would have remanded
the case to the Commission on the meeting-competition issue."5 He
also took issue with the language used by the majority with respect
to the derivative nature of section 2(f)."
VI. Beatrice-Kroger: THE LYING BUYER EXCEPTION
An issue expressly left open by the A & P majority opinion is
whether there exists an exception to the general rule of derivative
liability where the buyer induces receipt of a discriminatory price
by misrepresenting the nature of competing bids to a seller who
escapes liability by utilization of the good faith meeting-competi-
tion defense.8 5 This exception, referred to as the Beatrice-Kroger
doctrine or the "lying buyer" exception, arose from protracted liti-
gation before the FTC culminating in an opinion by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.80
In late 1961, the Kroger Company, a large grocery store chain,
decided to enter the private label milk business and sought bids
for the supply of milk and other dairy products. Initially, Kroger
sought bids from four suppliers: Broughton, Valley Bell, Fairmont,
and Borden. Subsequently, Beatrice joined the bidding.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 81.
83. Id. at 85-92.
84. Id. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 107-14 infra.
85. As the court stated, "Because A&P was not a 'lying buyer' we need not decide
whether such a buyer could be liable under § 2(f) even if the seller has a meeting-competi-
tion defense." 440 U.S. at 82 n.15.
86. Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,045
(FTC 1969), afl'd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
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In the course of negotiations, Mr. Casserly, the Kroger negotia-
tor, rejected Beatrice's initial offer of 71 cents per gallon of milk, a
fifteen percent discount, and stated that Broughton had already
offered a twenty percent discount. The Commission found that
Broughton's bid was not as represented by Casserly but was a
lesser discount.8 7 In a later bid Beatrice offered to reduce its price
to 68 cents per gallon to meet the alleged twenty percent
Broughton discount. Mr. Casserly rejected this bid on the grounds
that he had received a better offer from Fairmont. Beatrice then
reduced its price to 66 cents per gallon and Mr. Casserly accepted,
declaring the bid to be "competitive."88 The bid was, according to
the Commission, "significantly below the competition."'89
Both Beatrice and Kroger were charged with violations of the
Robinson-Patman Act; Beatrice for violating section 2(a) and Kro-
ger for violating section 2(f). The 2(a) complaint against Beatrice
was dismissed even though its bid "beat" competition. Commis-
sioner Jones referred to Beatrice's belief that its offer was "no
lower than was required under the circumstances," stressing that
its negotiators had no reason to know that their final offer "was in
fact significantly below the competition." 90
The majority was impressed with the difficulties which Beatrice
faced in determining the terms of the competitive offers in view of
Mr. Casserly's untruthfulness. Further, the various offers of the
dairies were not easily comparable. They covered a different vari-
ety of products and were based on different formulas. The good
faith defense was available because Beatrice did everything in its
power through investigation and testing of rumors to find the right
price level.91
The Commission decided, three to two, that Kroger had violated
section 2(f). The groupings of the Commissioners show the difficul-
ties they had in resolving the case. Commissioners Jones, Elman
and Nicholson formed the majority dismissing the complaint
87. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) %1 19,045 at 21,291, 21,294 (FTC
1969).
88. Id. at 21,296-97.
89. Id. at 21,308.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 21,307.
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against Beatrice. Commissioners Dixon, McIntyre and Jones
formed the majority ruling against Kroger. Thus, only Commis-
sioner Jones was on the majority side of both determinations and
each of the other four Commissioners dissented at least to one of
the two determinations.
The absolution of Beatrice did not exonerate Kroger, toward
whom Commissioner Jones took a much less charitable view, stat-
ing that
the burden of not exceeding Robinson-Patman bounds should, at
some point, fall on the buyer who plays the cards so close to his vest
as to persuade the seller to come down just a little more, and not on
the seller who has tried by every proper means to feel out the
opposition . 2
Kroger conveyed false information as to competitive offers, and
by this deception was held to have induced a discriminatory price
in violation of section 2(f). Under these circumstances, Kroger
could not avail itself of the section 2(b) defense accorded to
Beatrice.9
92. Id. at 21,308.
In the words of Commissioner Jones:
Here, Kroger was in a very powerful bargaining position because of its size and
importance to the dairies in the Charleston Division. This being so, Mr. Casserly went
beyond the bounds of permissible bargaining when he falsely gave the impression
that the original Broughton offer amounted to a 20 per cent discount; when he told
the Beatrice representatives that their 71 cent offer was too high on that specific
ground; when he first rejected their 68 cent offer and then indicated that their 66 cent
offer was "competitive" without having made any comparison of the bids, and when
he failed to convey any correct information about the price levels being quoted by
others. It is by reason of this conduct that Kroger took on the risk of liability under
the Robinson-Patman Act.
Kroger asserts that this means it cannot be liable if Beatrice is found to have acted
in good faith. We disagree. There may be instances in which a buyer is insulated from
liability by the seller's good faith but Automatic Canteen does not hold that the
buyer is always entitled to avail himself of such a defense, nor does it compel such a
result in the present situation. Undoubtedly a buyer can accept an offer made to meet
competition which in fact does beat a competing offer if the buyer has done nothing
to initiate the price break in the first place, but to hold that a buyer can escape
liability merely by inducing and accepting a second discriminatory offer which meets
an offer previously induced by the buyer would make a mockery of section 2(f).
93. Id. at 21,312.
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The cost justification issue was resolved adversely to Kroger, pri-
marily on the trade experience of Casserly. The circumstances
were held to be sufficient to place him on notice that Beatrice's bid
could not be justified. 4
Commissioner Elman, in dissent, complained that the portion of
the opinion dealing with Casserly's giving false information as to
competing offers and his failure to provide any correct information
about them would turn the statute into a truth-in-bargaining law
requiring affirmative disclosure.95 The opinion, however, does not
clearly establish an affirmative duty to disclose where the buyer
has not misled the seller. Further, Kroger's "powerful bargaining
position" was linked to Commissioner Jones' discussion of Cas-
serly's untruthfulness" and perhaps such nexus is required to
make untruthfulness unlawful.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the cease
and desist order of the FTC in Kroger Co. v. FTC.9" In an opinion
by former Supreme Court Justice Clark, sitting by designation, the
court stated:
Kroger seizes upon this circumstance contending that as a matter of
law the discharge of Beatrice requires the acquittal of Kroger be-
cause there cannot be a violation of section 2(f) without there being
one under section 2(a). While ordinarily this may be true-a matter
we need not and do not pass upon-it is not true under the peculiar
circumstances here, where Kroger was found by the Commission to
have given "false price information" to Beatrice as to Broughton's
competing bid which induced Beatrice in perfect good faith to meet
Broughton's equally low price.
Automatic Canteen, supra, holds only that buyers may avail them-
selves of discriminatory prices that a seller may lawfully grant or
"those that are not known by him [the buyer] not to be within one
of those defenses."
To hold otherwise in this case would put a premium on the
buyer's artifice and cunning in inducing discriminatory prices. In or-
94. Id. at 21,313. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra for further discussion of the
knowledge issue.
95. Id. at 21,316.
96. Id. at 21,312.
97. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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der for the buyer to be sheltered through exoneration of the seller
under section 2(b) the prices induced must come within the defenses
of that section not only from the seller's point of view, but also from
that of the buyer.98
The Court's denial of the seller's good faith defense to the buyer
was expressly based on the conveyance of false information and
was not intended to restrict honest bargaining. 9
The Beatrice-Kroger case established, for the first time, that a
transaction can be illegal for the buyer though lawful for the seller.
On the surface, such a holding seems inconsistent with both the
language of section 2(f) and the Supreme Court's Automatic Can-
teen opinion interpreting 2(f) as a provision which derivatively
premises buyer liability on the provision defining pricing legality
for the seller. As the Court stated in Automatic Canteen, "at the
least, we can be confident in reading the words in § 2(f), a discrimi-
nation in price which is prohibited by this section, as a reference to
the substantive prohibitions against discrimination by sellers de-
fined elsewhere in the Act."100 The Court went on to say that "a
buyer is not liable under § 2(f) if the lower prices he induces are
• . . within one of the seller's defenses. . . ...0 In Kroger the
prices induced were held to be within one of the seller's defenses,
that of good faith meeting of competition.
To adhere too rigidly to a notion of derivative illegality in a situ-
ation like Beatrice-Kroger, is, however, as Mr. Justice Clark recog-
nized, to sanction circumvention of section 2(f). Kroger's misrepre-
sentation made necessary an exception to the rule. Perhaps the
most effective way to analyze the problem is to consider it from the
perspective of the seller who is faced with a dilemma. On the one
98. Id. at 1374, 1377 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
99. As Justice Clark noted:
Moreover, we find no support for the charge that the Commission's holding places
the buyer at his peril whenever he engages in price bargaining. The use by the Com-
mission of the "hard-bargaining" language as well as the failure of Kroger "to convey
any correct information about the price levels being quoted by others" is but a warn-
ing, not a command. The controlling point here is not the "hard bargaining" nor the
price levels but the misrepresentation of the Broughton bid. ...
Id. at 1378.
100. 346 U.S. at 70.
101. Id. at 74.
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hand he is faced with an obligation under the Robinson-Patman
Act to ensure that his price is not illegally discriminatory. With
respect to the section 2(b) good faith meeting-competition defense,
this entails some obligation to find the price level at which his
competitors will sell.
On the other hand he is faced with an obligation to avoid any
form of price-fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act.102 An
exchange of price information with competitors may well tend to
stabilize prices and United States v. Container Corp. °03 stands as a
warning that such an exchange can violate the Sherman Act.
As beween the two obligations, one must yield. Price fixing is a
per se offense, but the meeting-competition defense is available on
a subjective good faith basis. For these reasons, the Supreme
Court, in 1978, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.1°4
held that a seller is permitted to establish good faith under the
meeting competition defense of the Robinson-Patman Act by ac-
tions falling short of actual interseller price verification. Thus, the
major reason the seller is not held liable in the Beatrice-Kroger
situation is the necessity of reconciling Robinson-Patman Act en-
forcement with broader antitrust policy. To require the seller to
check the accuracy of the buyer's representations by contacting
other sellers could lead to stabilization of industry prices or con-
certed price fixing. There is, however, no such similar policy reason
for absolving the misrepresenting buyer from liability.
While there may be a semantic problem in construing the stat-
ute to permit buyer liability where the seller is exonerated, there
remains a sound policy basis for allowing such a result where the
seller's good faith defense is based on the buyer's affirmative mis-
representation. Mr. Justice Clark appears to have dealt with the
problem in Kroger by holding that the section 2(b) requirement of
good faith must be met, not only by the seller, but also by a buyer
intending to rely on such defense.10 5 Where the seller is allowed to
escape liability because of his conflicting antitrust duties, there is
102. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
103. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
104. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
105. 438 F.2d at 1377. Mr. Justice Marshall apparently agrees. See 440 U.S. 69, 88 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting in part.)
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no sound reason in the Act to extend this exception to the buyer,
particularly where the buyer is the cause of the dilemma and ap-
parently did not act in good faith.
Under these conditions the seller does not have the opportunity
to warn the buyer of possible violations of the Act since the buyer
controls information relevant to the defense. In such circumstances
the primary purpose of section 2(f) is frustrated. Furthermore, to
adhere to an overly strict concept of derivative liability enables a
buyer to totally evade the Act by misrepresentation. In effect, the
buyer could create its own defense by misrepresenting to a seller
the bid needed to meet the bid of a competitor and then allow the
seller to rely on this erroneous information in good faith."' 6
While it may be argued that the Beatrice-Kroger exception did
not survive A&P1°7 it is submitted that this result is neither com-
pelled nor necessarily indicated by the Court's decision in that
case. First, the Court expressly stated that it was not reaching the
question of whether a "lying buyer" could be liable under section
2(f) where the seller had a meeting-competition defense.108
Second, the cases are distinguishable on their facts. As the Court
explicitly recognized, A&P did "not involve a 'lying buyer' situa-
tion."1 09 In reality, A&P represented an attempt by the FTC and
the Second Circuit to expand the scope of the Beatrice-Kroger
doctrine to encompass misrepresentation by silence.110 The Kroger
106. See opinion of Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, 440 U.S. at 88-89.
107. As Mr. Justice Marshall stated:
The Court purports to reserve this "lying buyer" issue, ante, at 81-82, n.15, but the
derivative standard it adopts today belies the reservation. If "prohibited by this sec-
tion" means that a buyer's liability depends on that of the seller, then absent seller
liability, the buyer's conduct and bad faith are necessarily irrelevant.
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 81-82 n.15.
109. Id.
110. The Second Circuit explicitly recognized that it was extending its holding beyond
the "lying buyer" situation. "While Kroger did indeed involve a 'lying buyer,' we do not
regard the Sixth Circuit's ruling as strictly limited to the situation where the charged buyer
affirmatively lied to the seller." 557 F.2d at 983.
Prior to the A&P decision, private plaintiffs had attempted to extend Beatrice-Kroger as
well. In Kapiolani Motors, Ltd. v. General Motors Corp., 337 F. Supp. 102 (D.C. Hawaii
1972), it was alleged that a dealer-buyer of automobiles filed false warranty claims with its
supplier so that the net amount paid by the buyer to the supplier was less than that paid by
a competing dealer-buyer. The plaintiff alleged that, like Kroger, the buyer used fraud to
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decision, by contrast, involved an affirmative act of mis-
representation.
In Kroger, the buyer's negotiator, in rejecting a fifteen percent
discount expressly stated that a competitor had offered a twenty
percent discount. This was not true. The buyer's negotiator then
rejected a second bid from seller designed to meet the alleged
twenty percent discount on the grounds that it had received a bet-
ter offer from yet another competitor. Buyer finally accepted a
third and yet lower offer from seller declaring it to be "competi-
tive" where such bid was significantly below competition.111
By contrast, the heart of the FTC case in A&P was that: (1)
Borden, the seller, informed A&P that its offer was being made to
meet offers then in A&P's hands; and (2) A&P accepted the offer
without informing Borden that its offer was substantially below
those of other bidders.1 2 Thus, A&P involved an attempt to ex-
tend the Beatrice-Kroger doctrine to misrepresentation by silence.
Silence can be a violation, however, only if there is a duty to dis-
close. Merely because the Court chose not to require affirmative
disclosure in A&P, a requirement which, if extended too far, could
easily interfere with price competition in a free market,113 does not
mean a buyer should not be liable in the Beatrice-Kroger situation
where it makes affirmative misrepresentations. 4
procure a lower net price.
The court held that fraud alone was not sufficient to hold the buyer liable under § 2(f),
stating that Kroger "does not stand for the bald proposition that any fraud upon a supplier
which may put money into a buyer's pocket constitutes an inducement of a price discrimi-
nation condemned by § 2(f)." 337 F. Supp. at 104. The court held that the fraud did not
constitute a price discrimination.
111. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
112. Proposed FTC complaint in The Great AtL and Pac. Tea Co., [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) §19,639 (FTC 1971).
113. In A&P, the Court noted that to require the buyer to make affirmative disclosure
"would almost inevitably frustrate competitive bidding and, by reducing uncertainty, lead to
price matching and anticompetitive cooperation among sellers." 440 U.S. at 80.
114. The Beatrice-Kroger doctrine, at least prior to A&P, has received recognition-in
other courts. See Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 386 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974) (buyer enti-
tled to rely on seller's 2(b) defense except when "it knowingly manipulated the competitive
bidding through false or disingenuous reporting of competitor's bids to induce lower bids.").
Compare Harbor Banana Distributors, Inc. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1974) ("A
prohibited discrimination is a condition precedent to a finding of unlawful conduct under
section 2(f)."). (This case did not, however, involve misrepresentation of type found in Bea-
trice-Kroger.).
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VII. PRIVATE SUITS UNDER SECTION 2(f)
A section 2(f) violation is subject to a private suit for treble
damages, but there have been few litigated decisions. Perhaps this
is due to the fact that it is often easier and more convenient to sue
the seller. Suits against a seller do not involve the often difficult
proof of knowledge that suits against the buyer require.
One issue with respect to the private suit is whether a private
plaintiff under section 2(f) has the same burden of going forward
with evidence as to the buyer's knowledge that must be met by the
Commission. In Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Simplot Co.,115 the
Fifth Circuit held that'Texas Gulf, the plaintiff, had knowingly in-
duced a discrimination in price. Texas Gulf's 2(f) claim was as-
serted not for treble damages, but in defense to a suit by the buyer
on a contract. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that the buyer
had not induced an illegal discrimination.
In discussing its standard of fairness and convenience in Auto-
matic Canteen, the Supreme Court noted that the Commission,
"with its broad power of investigation and subpoena . . . is on a
better footing to obtain this information than the buyer."1"6 The
private plaintiff lacks such resources. The Court also declared that
"the buyer does not have the required information, and for good
reason should not be required to obtain it .... ,,1 as the control-
ling reason for striking the balance as it did. The private plaintiff
also lacks the information.
Lower courts dealing with private suits have assumed that the
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant induced dis-
criminatory prices knowing they were not cost-justified,1 8 and that
the discrimination could not be justified. 1 9
115. 418 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1969).
116. 346 U.S. at 79.
117. 346 U.S. at 78.
118. Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F. Supp. 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affl'd,
511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975). The district court declared that plaintiff had the burden of
showing "by a meticulous attention to details" that discriminatory prices were induced with
knowledge that they were not cost justified. The court relied on an FTC enforcement case
and did not discuss any difference between private plaintiffs and the FTC. 327 F. Supp. at
1276, 1277. See also Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 33-34
(7th Cir. 1976).
119. Big Value Stamp Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 1967 Trade Cases, T 71, 978 (S.D.
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Perhaps fairness requires that the initial burden be on the pri-
vate plaintiff since it is he who seeks to gain by the lawsuit. Bar-
gaining considerations still dictate that sellers not be required to
put all their costs on the table when dealing with buyers. By the
same standard of fairness, however, the private plaintiff should not
be required to rigorously prove lack of cost justification. Coming
forward with evidence that the buyer should have known of the
absence of cost justification should be sufficient. 120
Finding that the buyer's knowledge had not been established,
the court in Texas Gulf did not reach the issue of whether a seller
may charge its own buyer with a violation of section 2(f). It has
been suggested 121 that this issue should be resolved not by focusing
on the language of section 2(f) but rather by looking to the lan-
guage of section 4 of the Clayton Act1 22 which provides that any
person injured in his business or on his property as a result of a
violation of the antitrust laws may sue for treble damages.
Since an unlawful discrimination by the seller is usually a pre-
requisite for a suit against a buyer, the buyer might raise an in
pari delicto defense. It has been suggested,2 3 however, that the
Supreme Court's decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp.1 24 would tend to make this defense unavailable.
Mark Plastic Products, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.1 25 involved a seller
charging its own buyer with a violation of section 2(f). Originally,
Mark Plastic sued Exxon under 2(a) alleging that Exxon sold it a
film resin at a price higher than that given a favored customer,
Mobil Oil Company. Exxon, the seller, filed a counterclaim alleging
that Mark Plastic, the buyer, had itself induced Exxon to sell the
product to it at a discriminatory price, thus violating section 2(f).
The president of Mark Plastic was joined in the counterclaim.
Though not specifically addressing the question of whether a
Ohio 1967).
120. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
121. Applebaum, Fundamentals of Buyer's Violation Under Robinson-Patman Act, 39
ANTITRUST L.J. 869, 880-81 (1970).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1973).
123. Applebaum, supra note 121, at 881.
124. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
125. 1973-2 Trade Cases, 74,784 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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seller can sue its own buyer, the district court refused to dismiss
the counterclaim. The court noted that section 4 of the Clayton
Act does not restrict "persons" entitled to sue and held that Exxon
had stated a claim on which relief could be granted.
Whether a seller can sue his buyer or not is an unsettling ques-
tion. On the one hand is the clear language of section 4 of the
Clayton Act which states that "any person" may sue. The Robin-
son-Patman Act is, however, imperfect in many ways.12 6 It well
may be that the draftsmen did not intend, or at least did not con-
template, the possibility of section 2(f) suits by a seller against his
own buyer. As has been mentioned, the purpose of section 2(f) was
to make it easier for the seller to abide by the law and resist buyer
pressure.127 This was to be accomplished by informing the buyer
that the demand for a price cut was not cost justified, thus charg-
ing the buyer with "knowledge of the illegality of the discount, and
equal liability for it. 1 28 The primary focus remained, in the eyes of
the draftsmen, on the seller. If the seller can sue his own buyer he
can charge him with more than knowledge and equal liability.
Perhaps the question will not be of great importance generally
due to the possible consequences of instituting such a suit. The
standard of fairness and convenience puts the burden of producing
evidence that the price was not cost justified on the plaintiff. In
this case, the burden is easily met by the seller who alone possesses
such information.
By producing the information, though, the seller makes out a
section 2(a) case against himself for some treble damage plaintiff
waiting in the wings and deprives himself of the cost justification
defense. At the very least, he is vulnerable to attack by the FTC. If
the case is one of standard section 2(f) derivative liability, the
seller must prove that he violated 2(a) to hold the buyer liable
under 2(f). Perhaps only in the Beatrice-Kroger type situation, if
126. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968) ("the Robinson-Patman amend-
ments by no means represent an exemplar of legislative clarity"); Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) ("precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of
the Robinson-Patman Act").
127. 80 CONG. REC. 9419 (1936).
128. Id.
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the exception to derivative liability survives,12 9 will the question of
seller suits under 2(f) be important.
VIII. SECTION 5 OF THE FTCA
The FTC and the courts have held that a buyer's knowing in-
ducement and receipt of a discriminatory allowance is an unfair
method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act on the rationale that such action was necessary to
close a loophole in the Robinson-Patman Act.130 The FTC decided
that Congress had intended to make the knowing inducement or
receipt of disproportionate allowances a violation of section 2(f)
but failed to do so as a result of legislative oversight.131
While a broad discussion of the cases arising under the Federal
Trade Commission Act is beyond the scope of this article, use of
section 5 in place of section 2(f) raises a number of questions di-
rectly relating to section 2(f). The first is whether it is necessary to
use section 5 or, whether inducement and receipt of discriminatory
allowances and services, barred to the seller by section 2(d) and
section 2(e), can be reached by section 2(f).
Earlier FTC and court decisions hold that a purchaser who in-
duces and receives a discriminatory advertising allowance violates
section 2(f). 32 The Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen explic-
itly declined to pass on the question of whether section 2(f) em-
braces the prohibitions of 2(d) and 2(e).133
Looking to the words of the provision itself, establishment of a
2(f) violation requires proof of a "discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section." If one focuses on the words "this sec-
tion" an argument can be made that 2(f) is intended to apply
129. See text accompanying notes 85-114 supra.
130. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Giant Food Inc. v.
FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); Fred Meyer, Inc. v.
FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied on this issue, 386 U.S. 907 (1967); Alterman
Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974).
131. Grand Union Co., 57 FTC 382 (1960), modified, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
132. See Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 922 (5th Cir.
1962); Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485, 491-92 (1939).
133. 346 U.S. 61 at 73 n. 14; accord, American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 111 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir.
1962).
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equally to subsections (a), (d) and (e) of section 2. If one reads the
words "discrimination in price" literally, however, one might con-
clude that only 2(a) violations are reached. Section 2(a) is the only
subdivision explicitly prohibiting price discrimination. Sections
2(d) and 2(e) prohibit specific practices without regard to whether
they amount to a discrimination in price. The legislative history of
2(f) seems to support this latter approach. Congressman Utterback
stated with respect to section 2(f) that "this paragraph makes the
buyer liable for knowingly inducing or receiving any discrimination
in price which is unlawful under the first paragraph of the amend-
ment."13' The first paragraph of the amendment is 2(a).135
Such analysis should not end the inquiry, however. Inducement
and receipt of allowances can violate 2(f) if the granting of such
allowances violates 2(a). Section 2(a) makes both direct and indi-
rect price discriminations unlawful. Therefore the mere label at-
tached to a discriminatory allowance should not preclude attack
under section 2(a) if it can be translated into a price advantage
having the prohibited effect.1 86
Referring to section 2(f) and its scope, Congressman Utterback
said:
That applies both to direct and indirect discrimination; and where,
for example, there is discrimination in terms of sale or in allowances
connected or related to the contract of sale, of such a character as to
constitute or effect an indirect discrimination in price, the liability
for knowingly inducing or receiving such discrimination or allowance
is clearly provided for under the latter paragraph above referred
to
13 7
Thus, section 2(f) extends to include allowances "connected or re-
lated to the contract of sale" where the effect is that of a discrimi-
nation in price.
134. 80 CONG. REC. 9419 (1936).
135. In 1961, Representative Patman introduced H.R. 124, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), to
amend § 2(f) to cover all violations of § 2(a), § 2(d), or § 2(e). 107 CONG. REC. 102 (1961).
The proposed amendment did not become law.
136. See generally Rowe, supra note 1, at 425, 528-30.
137. 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
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The Ninth Circuit in Fred Meyer,13 8 while choosing not to de-
cide the question, noted that there is support for the proposition
that 2(a) and 2(d) are not mutually exclusive but can overlap to
bring certain payments under both. As the court stated, "Even a
successfully completed proceeding against a supplier for a 2(d) vio-
lation would not necessarily foreclose a contemporaneous or subse-
quent action against an inducing buyer for a 2(a)-2(f) violation
where the payments involved violate both sections. ' 139
The decision to use section 5 has resulted in an apparent anom-
aly. Discrimination by a seller in granting promotional allowances
is subject to treble damage challenge. However, the unlawful in-
ducement of such allowances is immune from a treble damage at-
tack since section 5 is not considered one of the antitrust laws and
is therefore not available to private litigants.1 40 For this reason, the
possible overlap of 2(a) and 2(d) is important. If a private litigant
can show the court that a disproportionate allowance has the effect
of a discrimination in price and therefore violates 2(a) as well as
2(d), he should not be denied a right of action against the buyer
under 2(f).
Such a resolution is consistent with the legislative history which
viewed all discriminatory allowances and services as forms of price
discrimination. Section 2(d) was aimed at "the grant of discrimina-
tions under the guise of payments for advertising and promotional
services ... .,"141 The terms of the provision were made intention-
ally broad to prevent evasion.1 42 As Mr. Rowe put it, the Commis-
sion "waived application of section 2(f) to the receipt of promo-
tional benefits and instead invoked the general prohibitions of
'unfair methods of competition' . ,,14s The FTC, however, had
much to gain from such a "waiver," for its task was simplified by
resort to section 5. Under section 5 the FTC must show only that
the buyer knowingly induced a seller to violate 2(d) or 2(e).4 The
138. 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966).
139. Id. at 362.
140. See General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side Winery, 396 F.Supp. 590 (E.D.
Wis. 1975).
141. 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback).
142. Id.
143. Rowe, supra note 1, at 433.
144. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1962), modifying 57
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section 2(f) requirement of buyer knowledge is thus blended with
the proportional equality criteria of 2(d) and 2(e) to produce a hy-
brid violation.
It should be noted that whereas a charge under 2(f) requires
proof of unlawful price discrimination, which includes proof of the
requisite adverse competitive effect, a section 5 violation by a
buyer involves showing only the inducement of an allowance or
service that was not available on proportionally equal terms. A
showing of competitive injury is not required. It would be unfair
for this "waiver" to cause private plaintiffs to lose their right of
action. Their rights should not be sacrificed for the administrative
convenience of the FTC.
IX. CONCLUSION
Today, many years after passage of the Robinson-Patman Act,
the needs of small retailers and wholesalers are no longer the pub-
lic's primary concern. They have been supplanted in the public
mind by the needs of consumers. The Act, however, remains law.
Despite the passage of time, the main paradox of the statute sur-
vives. Though aimed at the power of large buyers, the burden of
the Act seems to fall more heavily on sellers. Beatrice-Kroger indi-
cates that, in some respects at least, buyers can bear equal respon-
sibility for the conduct of negotiations if they abuse their power. If
a buyer chooses to disclose information as to competing bids, it
must not misrepresent them. For this reason, the survival of the
Beatrice-Kroger doctrine is necessary for accomplishment of the
central purpose of the Act, curbing the abuse of power by large
buyers.
F.T.C. 382, 410 (1960).
[Vol. 15:547
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 SPRING 1981 NUMBER 3
EDITORIAL BOARD
HUGH T. HARRISON II
Editor-in-Chief
JOYCE ANN NAUMANN
Executive Editor
ELIZABETH C. SHUFF
Manuscripts Editor
JANICE M. HAMILTON
Articles Editor
BARBARA H. VANN
Comments Editor
KENNETH E. CHADWICK
Notes Editor
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
ANN M. ANNASE
W. F. DREWRY GALLALEE
ELIZABETH C. GAY
JAMES E. ANDERSON
LISA ANDERSON-LLoYD
CYNTHIA V. BAILEY
MICHAEL J. BARBOUR
JAMES P. BARRY
GARY A. BASKIN
W. TODD BENSON
ANN R. BERGAN
STUART W. BLAIN
GARY L. CARDWELL
THOMAS E. CARR
R. PAUL CHILDRESS, JR.
ALICIA J. CLEGG
NATHANIEL E. CLEMENT
NAN L. COLEMAN
MARY G. COMMANDER
BARBARA A. DALVANO
PATRICK C. DEVINE, JR.
R. CRAIG EVANS
MARLENE F. GIBBONS
DONNA J. KATOS
LnDA F. RIGSBY
J. PHILIP HART
Managing Editor
STAFF
SARAH H. FINLEY
DEBORAH L. FLETCHER
AGNES GORMLEY
TIMOTHY H. HANKINS
JANINE S. HILLER
LOUISE L. HOOVER
S. OWEN HUNT
MARY M. HUTCHESON
JOHN M. IVAN
LYNN F. JACOB
ELIZABETH P. KARN
NANCY G. LAGow
ROBERT B. LLOYD, JR.
KEVIN B. LYNCH
JAMES M. MCCAULEY
KAREN IV. MCCUTCHEON
SCOTT A. MILBURN
JENNIE L. MONTGOMERY
JON A. MUELLER
WILLIAM F. NEELY
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GWEN M. SCHOCKEMOEHL
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